Prosper Team, Inc. v. Workforce Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services, and Phillip L. Hickman : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Prosper Team, Inc. v. Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services, and Phillip L.
Hickman : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Daniel J. Anderson; counsel for petitioner.
Suzan Pixton; attorney for respondent.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Prosper Team v. Workforce Appeals Board, No. 20100385 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2339
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROSPER TEAM, INC. ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD - ^ 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, ; 
AND PHILLIP L. HICKMAN 
Respondents. ] 
) BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
) Appeal No. 20100385-CA 
) Agency Decision, 10-B-00148 
) Agency Reconsideration, 10-R-00377 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE MARCH 8, 2010 DECISION 
OF THE UTAH WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES' AWARD OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Susan Pixton #2608 
Attorney for Respondent 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
140 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244 
Daniel J. Anderson #6699 
Counsel for Petitioner 
Prosper Team, Inc. 
5072 North 300 West 
Provo, UT 84604 
Oral Arguments Requested FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 1 2 2010 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROSPER TEAM, INC. ; 
Petitioner, ] 
Vb. 
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD - ^ 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE ; 
SERVICES, ; 
AND PHILLIP L. HICKMAN ; 
Respondents. ] 
) BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
) Appeal No. 201003 85-CA 
) Agency Decision, 10-B-00148 
) Agency Reconsideration, 10-R-00377 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE MARCH 8, 2010 DECISION 
OF THE UTAH WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES' AWARD OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Susan Pixton #2608 
Attorney for Respondent 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
140 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244 
Daniel J. Anderson #6699 
Counsel for Petitioner 
Prosper Team, Inc. 
5072 North 300 West 
Provo, UT 84604 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE WORKFORCE APPEALS 
BOARD DECISION FOR CORRECTNESS AND AFFORD THE 
BOARD ONLY A MODERATE LEVEL OF DEFERENCE 8 
II. THE BOARD ERRED IN AWARDING UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ECONOMY 
PREVENTED HICKMAN FROM MAKING SALES 9 
A. The Board erroneously reads "fault" out of a just cause 
discharge by concluding that Hickman was eligible for benefits 
because he could not "control" the economy 9 
B. The Board inappropriately required "control" over elements 
that could not be within Hickman's control thus creating a strict 
liability standard 13 
C. Hickman did not need to have "complete control" over the 
circumstances leading to his separation and it was arbitrary and 
capricious to require such 15 
D. The record establishes that it was within Hickman's "control" 
to make sales 16 
I 
III. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE FOR A JUST CAUSE 
DISCHARGE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED 18 
CONCLUSION 23 
ADDENDUM A - Determinative Statutes or Rules 
ADDENDUM A - Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
ADDENDUM B - Decision of Workforce Appeals Board 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Allen v. Department of Workforce Services 2005 UT App 186, 112 P.3d 1238 8 
Autoliv v. Department of Workforce Services, 2001 UT App 198, 29 P.3d 7 8, 9 
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n., 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) 2 
Gerber v. Board of Review, 712 A.2d 688 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1998) 11 
Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of Review, 723 P.2d 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1986) ...9, 10, 13 
Law Offices of David Paul White & Assoc, v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 21 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) 21,22 
Nelson v. Department of Employment Security, 801 P.2d 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ....2, 9 
Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 8, 16 
Selfv. Board of Review, 453 A. 2d 170 (NJ. 1982) 10 
Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec, 751P.2d 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 15 
Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Bureau of Employment Services, 653 N.E.2d 1207 
(Ohio 1995) 14 
Yardville Supply Co. v. Board of Review, 554 A.2d 1337 (N.J. 1989) 11 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-508(8)(a)(West 2009) 1,2 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)(West 2009) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv)(West 2009) 1, 2, 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a)(West 2009) 1 
Utah Administrative Rules 
Utah Admin. Code R994-102-101(l)(2010) 2, 14 
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(2)(2010) 2,19,21 
Utah Admin. CodeR994-405-202(3)(2010) 2, 10, 12, 16, 19 
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208(5)(2010) 2,12 
Utah Admin. Code R994-508-101(4)&(5)(2010) 2, 21 
Utah Admin. Code R994-508-305(2010) 21 
ii 
Petitioner Prosper Team, Inc. respectfully submits its brief on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a)(West 2009)(the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over "final 
orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies"); 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(d), 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv) (West 2009)("the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings" when the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law or the agency action is otherwise arbitrary or capricious); and Utah Code Ann. § 
35A-4-508(8)(a)(West 2009)("any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by 
commencing an action in the court of appeals against the Workforce Appeals Board"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues require consideration by the Court as a result of the 
Workforce Appeals Board's March 8, 2010, decision and subsequent denial of its 
Request for Reconsideration (April 15, 2010), awarding unemployment insurance 
benefits to Phillip L. Hickman ("Hickman") and assessing costs against Prosper Team, 
Inc. ("Prosper"). 
1. Did the Board err in awarding unemployment benefits on the grounds that it was not 
within Claimants control to make sales merely because of the economy was down? As 
a mixed question of law and fact, the standard of review is whether the Board's 
decision erroneously interprets or applies the law and exceeds the bounds of 
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reasonableness and rationality, Nelson v. Department of Employment Sec, 801 P.2d 
158, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), or is otherwise arbitrary or capricious Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
2. Did the Board err in holding the Claimant did not have knowledge that he 
would be terminated for poor performance? The standard of review is whether or not 
the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence," Drake v. Industrial 
Comm'n., 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997), or is otherwise arbitrary or capricious Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
STATEMENT OF PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
Prosper has preserved the issues presented to this Court, [n its Docketing 
Statement, Prosper identified the issues of whether it was within Hickman's "control" 
to make sales and whether Hickman had knowledge that he would be terminated for 
poor performance. In its appeal to the Workforce Appeals Board, Prosper raised the 
issue of "control" relative to sales, (Record at 073-075). Prosper inadvertently did not 
accurately address the issue of "knowledge" in its original request to the Board by 
stating that the element of knowledge had been met, but corrected this oversight and 
preserved the issue by addressing it in its Motion for Reconsideration. (Record at 090-
093). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
The statutes and rules are determinative in this matter are set forth in Appendix A, 
which include the following: 
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§35A-4-4-5(2), Utah Code Annotated 
R994-102-101(l), Utah Administrative Rules 
R994-405-202, Utah Administrative Rules 
R994-405-208(5), Utah Administrative Rules 
R994-508-101, Utah Administrative Rules 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the award of unemployment benefits to Phillip L. 
Hickman, and the Workforce Appeals Board's decision affirming the Administrative 
Law Judge's award of the benefits. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The statement of facts is based upon the transcripts of the hearing in this case, 
the record, the pleadings of the parties, and the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge ("ALJ") and Workforce Appeals Board ("Board"). 
1. Petitioner Prosper Team, Inc., is a Utah Corporation and Respondents are the 
Utah Workforce Appeals Board of the Department of Workforce Services and Phillip 
L. Hickman a former employee of Prosper. (Record at 100; Record at 040, lines 7-9) 
(hereinafter "R. at _ " ) . 
2. Hickman worked for Prosper for four years as a sales representative selling 
financial coaching services over the telephone. (R. at 039-040, lines 34-44, 7-9). 
Hickman knew what it took to be successful, and had been successful in his 
employment. (Record at 046, lines 11-20) 
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3. Hickman was paid on commissions, (R. at 040, lines 25-28), and was 
discharged on October 28, 2009, for poor sales performance. (R. at 040, lines 34-41; 
052, lines 42-43). 
4. Prosper worked with another company that transferred individuals to Prosper 
employees at which point any available salesperson could answer the phone and offer 
Prosper's products and services. (R. at 049, lines 16-21). When Hickman did not make 
sales, Prosper lost money by paying for the customer leads transferred to it that did not 
convert into sales. (Id.) 
5. Beginning in April/May 2009, Hickman's sales began to decline. (R. at 042, 
lines 3-4). Between June 2009 and October 2009, Hickman made only two sales. (R. 
at 056, lines 28-40, R. at 061, lines 6-10; R. at 008, Exhibit 8). 
6. In June 2009, Hickman underwent a non-work-related hernia surgery and was 
off work for five days. (R. at 054-055, lines 40-45, 1-2). After returning to work 
Prosper allowed Hickman to work part-time until being released by his doctor to work 
full time on August 3, 2009. (R. at 055, lines 6-17; R. at 027, Exhibit 27). 
7. After Hickman's return to full-time status, Hickman made one sale on August 
29, 2009, and then made no other sales before being discharged on October 28, 2009. 
(R. at 056, lines 39-40; R. at 008, Exhibit 8). 
8. Hickman's supervisor concluded that Hickman was not making sales because of 
his negative attitude and mindset. (R. at 044, lines 33-37; 046, lines 26-30). Hickman 
was not confident about the programs he was offering, (R. at 044, lines 30-45; R. at 
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045, lines 37-39), and Hickman's supervisor believed that more coaching or warnings 
would not improve his performance (R. at 044, lines 18-22). 
9. Hickman knew his sales were down and he needed to improve. (R. at 056, line 
21; R. at 055, lines 1-2; R. 063 at 17-18). He had several discussions and coaching 
sessions with his supervisor where he was told to improve his work performance. (R. 
at 043-044, lines 30-45, 1-22). Hickman's sales performance did not improve. (R. at 
044, lines 11-13). 
II. Marshaled Facts Supporting Terminated Was Without Just Cause 
10. Because Hickman work in sales, his success was influenced by a variety of 
factors such as the economy (R. at R. at 057, line 31-35), or customers who don't want 
to spend money. (R. at 058, lines 34-45). For a period of time Hickman felt his sales 
were down because he was using a script that was slower (R. at 043, lines 1-11; R at 
058, lines 8-18). Hickman also ascribes lower sales to the fact that at times he wasn't 
feeling well. (R. at 055, lines 21-29; R. at 057, lines 20-26). 
11. Though Hickman knew his sales were down and he was not meeting 
expectations, (R. at 056, line 21; R. at 055, lines 1-2; R. 063 at 17-18), Hickman 
though Prosper would "work with" him until his performance improved (R. at 056, 
lines 9-19; R. at 057, lines 20-26, R at 077). Hickman didn't believe he would be 
terminated for his poor performance because Prosper never used the word "fired" in its 
discussions with him or in his performance warnings (R. at 063, lines 12-24). 
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III. Additional Facts Supporting Termination Was For Just Cause 
12. Hickman believed it was within his control to make sales. He testified "you 
have to just look at yourself and find out what you're doing wrong so that you can go 
ahead and get yourself out of that situation." (R. at 059, lines 22-31; 058, lines 20-28). 
Hickman's supervisor testified that Prosper provided the necessary tools to enable 
Hickman to make sales, and it was within Hickman's control to make sales. (R. at 048, 
lines 36-45). 
13. New customers were randomly transferred to Prosper employees and each 
employee had the same opportunity to accept calls and make sales. (R. at 047, lines 
11-28; R. at 064, lines 1-14). Hickman was not making sales while other similarly 
situated employees were making sales and meeting expectations. (R. at 045, lines 1-7; 
R. at 049, lines 1-7). 
14. Hickman admitted being instructed both verbally (R. at 042, lines 15-18; R. at 
047, lines 38-42; R. at 063, lines 20-24) and in writing, (R. at 063, lines 12-13; R. at 
010 Exhibit 10, and 015-17, Exhibits 15-17), that his performance needed to improve. 
(R. at 063, lines 3-7). 
15. Hickman admitted that he knew of other employees who were terminated for 
poor sales performance. (R. at 061, lines 29-31; R. at 063, lines 26-30). 
16. Shortly before termination, Hickman signed a written performance warning that 
cautioned him if his performance did not improve, that further disciplinary "up to and 
including termination" may result. (R. at 013, Exhibit 13). Hickman's supervisor 
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believed Hickman understood that he would be terminated if his performance did not 
improve. (R. at 049, lines 28-31). 
17. Hickman applied for unemployment insurance benefits on November 5, 2009. 
(R. at 001, Exhibit 1). The adjudicator assigned to review Hickman's application for 
unemployment benefits determined the element of "control" had not been satisfied, 
and that Hickman had been terminated without just cause. (R. at 011, Exhibit 11). On 
November 24, 2009, the Department of Workforce Services issued a decision of 
eligibility for unemployment benefits. (R. at 024, Exhibit 24). 
19. On December 2, 2009, Prosper appealed the decision of eligibility (R. at 025, 
Exhibit 25) and on December 29, 2009, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") 
conducted an unemployment hearing issuing a decision on January 7, 2010, awarding 
benefits. (R. at 070-072). On February 2, 1010, Prosper appealed the award of 
benefits to the Workforce Appeals Board, (R. at 073-075) and the Board affirmed the 
ALJ's decision on March 8, 2010 (R. at 085-089). On March 22, 2010, Prosper filed a 
Request for Reconsideration which was denied on April 15, 2010 (R. at 097-099). 
Prosper then filed a timely Petition for Review on May 17, 2010. (R. at 100-101). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Prosper appeals the award of unemployment benefits on the grounds that it was 
within Hickman's control to make sales. Other similarly situated employees were 
successful in making sales. It is a misapplication of the Employment Security Act to 
hold that it is not within an employee's "control" to make sales merely because the 
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economy is down or consumers have competing interests for their money. 
Additionally, the Board acted arbitrary or capriciously in holding that the Claimant did 
not have "knowledge" he would be terminated for poor performance. The record 
establishes Hickman received both oral and written warnings and admitted knowing he 
needed to improve his performance. The Board's failure to correctly apply the law to 
the facts was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and a reversal of the award of 
unemployment benefits is in order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE WORKFORCE 
APPEALS BOARD DECISION FOR CORRECTNESS AND AFFORD 
THE BOARD ONLY A MODERATE LEVEL OF DEFERENCE. 
Whether an employee is terminated for "just cause" is a mixed question of 
law and fact. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 115 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). In Allen v. Department of Workforce Services, 2005 UT App 186, TJ6, 
112 P.3d 1238, this Court held "in reviewing [an agency's] interpretations of general 
questions of law, this Court applies a correction-of-error standard, with no deference to 
the expertise of the [agency]."(alteration in original). Issues that do not require highly 
specialized knowledge uniquely within the Board's understanding, should be reviewed 
"with only moderate deference" Autoliv v. Department of Workforce Services, 2001 
UT App 198, TJ16, 29 P.3d 7. To the extent that the Board's application of the law to 
factual findings is at issue, the degree of deference this Court should allow "is 
ordinarily determined by a 'sliding scale,' which hinges on policy concerns, the 
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agency's expertise, and whether the issue is fact-driven or susceptible to uniform legal 
rules." Autoliv at*{\6 (citations omitted). 
II. THE BOARD ERRED IN AWARDING UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ECONOMY PREVENTED 
HICKMAN FROM MAKING SALES. 
A. The Board erroneously reads "fault" out of a just cause discharge by 
concluding that Hickman was eligible for benefits because he could not "control" 
the economy. 
The primary issue on appeal is whether as a matter of law a commissioned sales 
employee is entitled to unemployment benefits merely because the economy is not 
wholly within his or her "control"? 
In order to establish a "just cause" discharge, an employer is required to 
establish the elements of knowledge, control and culpability. Nelson v. Department of 
Employment Sec, 801 P.2d 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Though various cases have 
provided insights on the elements of knowledge and culpability, there is sparse insight 
on the issue of "control". 
The elements of knowledge, control and culpability are elements considered in 
determining fault. Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of Review, 723 P.2d 427 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1986). These elements are to be aids in determining whether the employee is at 
fault in causing the unemployment. The finding of fault does not require malicious 
purpose or willful misconduct, but rather, "continued inefficiency, repeated 
carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a reasonable person in a similar 
circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the claimant had the ability to 
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perform satisfactorily" satisfy the requirement. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-
202(3)(a)(2010) (Emphasis added). See also, Logan at 430. 
In this case, Hickman was a commissioned sales employee terminated for lack 
of sales. The Board concluded that it was not within Hickman's "control" to do his job 
because the economy was down and because consumers could spend their money 
elsewhere. The Board concluded that Hickman (and by implication all other sales 
employees), must be able to control the economy and consumer purchasing decisions 
in order to establish a just cause discharge. Such analysis does away with the finding 
of fault and looks at knowledge, control and culpability as elements distinct from fault. 
Fault can arise from different sources. Fault can come from the actions or 
inactions of the employee, the actions or inactions of the employer, or from the actions 
or inactions of third-parties. In cases where fault is the result of the actions or 
inactions of the employee benefits are generally denied since it was the employee's 
conduct that led to the separation. In cases where the fault is due to the actions or 
inactions the employer benefits are generally allowed as it was the employer's conduct 
that led to the separation. However, in cases where the fault comes from the actions or 
inactions of third parties, or from factors outside the control of either party, careful 
analysis must be applied to determine whether the separation is in fact a result of the 
employee's culpable conduct. Logan at 429. 
In Selfv. Board of Review, 453 A. 2d 170 (N.J. 1982), the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey faced a similar problem when Self could no longer come to work because 
a fellow employee who provided the transportation to work decided to quit. Since Self 
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was unable to find transportation to get to work, it was determined that the claimant 
quit without good cause.1 In concluding that Self was not eligible for benefits, the 
Court distinguished the facts of the case from cases where the employer made changes 
to the business. In concluding that in this case it was the employee at fault, the Court 
stated "In the present case, the employer did nothing to increase the commuting 
problems of claimants. In short, the reason they were unable to get to work was not 
work-related, but personal." Self at 460. (Emphasis added). See also Gerber v. Board 
of Review, 712 A.2d 688, 692 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1998) (quoting Self that "the critical 
element was that the employer had done nothing to bring about the employees' 
problems"). 
Similarly, in Yardville Supply Co. v. Board of Review, 554 A.2d 1337 (N.J. 
1989), the Supreme Court found that claimant's loss of his driver's license as the result 
of a non job-related drunk driving charge was not the employer's fault and benefits 
were denied. The Court found reasoned that "[The employer] had no control over 
[claimant's] reckless decision to gamble his driver's license [and] It would be unfair to 
make [the employer] bear the economic costs of [claimant's] misconduct." Id. at 1337. 
Utah's unemployment Rules have adopted a similar standard. For example, in 
cases where the discharge is due to the loss of a license, the Rules generally find the 
claimant not eligible for unemployment benefits because "Control is established as the 
claimant made a decision to risk the loss of his or her license by failing to make other 
arrangements for transportation." Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208(5)(2010). 
1
 The Court reviewed the case as a voluntary quit rather than a discharge. 
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In this case, Hickman was terminated for poor sales performance. Hickman's 
sales performance suffered while other similarly situated employees were meeting 
expectations. In awarding benefits the Board did not focus on whether Hickman 
conduct resulted in his lack of sales, but rather, on whether the economy was within 
his control. Such an analysis ignores the issue of fault and awards terminated 
employees benefits irrespective of their culpable conduct. 
Critical analysis needed to be applied regarding whether Hickman engaged in 
culpable conduct. The Department's Rules state that "continued inefficiency, repeated 
carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a reasonable person in a similar 
circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the claimant bad the ability to 
perform satisfactorily." Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(3)(a)(2010)(Emphasis 
added). For three and a half years Hickman satisfactorily performed his job. Jn 
April/May 2009, Hickman's performance declined and he only had two sales in six 
months. Other employees were successfully selling in the same economy. The 
variable in this case was not the economy, but rather, Hickman's "continued 
inefficiency" which the Department's Rules deem to be within Claimant's control. 
Prosper asserts that it was Hickman's "continued inefficiency" is what led to his 
separation. The Board should not be able to side-step its duty to analyze the issue of 
fault and award benefits oh the ground that the economy wasn't within an employee's 
control. 
In Logan, the Hospital sought to diminish the concept of fault by adding "just 
cause" as an additional ground to protect an employer from having to pay 
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unemployment benefits. Logan at 429. In this case, the Board is similarly trying to 
read the concept of fault out of the Employment Security Act by awarding 
unemployment benefits on the grounds that the economy wasn't within Hickman's 
control. Such as standard is not only indefensible to employers, but unemployment 
benefits will always be found regardless of fault. Prosper asserts that the Board has 
ignored the issue of fault and awarded benefits because of the status of the economy. 
It was arbitrary or capricious for the Board to award unemployment benefits on the 
grounds that Hickman could not "control" the economy. 
B. The Board inappropriately required TfcontrolM over elements that could not be 
within Hickmanfs control thus creating a strict liability standard. 
In awarding unemployment benefits to Hickman, the Board significantly 
changed the unemployment eligibility rules and effectively guaranteed unemployment 
benefits to all sales employees. As such, the Board has created a strict liability 
standard. 
Hickman was a sales employee that was paid on commission. This type of 
employee is not unique to Prosper. There are many business and industries that 
employ commissioned sales personnel. Regardless of the company or industry, 
commissioned sales employees are all subject to the ups and downs of the economy. If 
the standard for unemployment benefits is that sales employees need to be able to 
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"control" the economy, sales employees will always be afforded unemployment 
benefits. 
The Economy Security Act is premises on the notion that benefits are awarded 
when the employee is separated "due to no fault of their own"3. Utah Admin. Code 
R994-102-101(1). Hickman wasn't separate "due to no fault of his own". The record 
establishes that Hickman was in fact terminated due to his continued inefficiency as a 
sales representative - of which he was at fault. This conclusion is amply supported by 
the record. The fact that other similarly situated employees were succeeding v/here 
Hickman was failing establishes that it wasn't the economy that was at fault. 
It was reversible error for the Board to create the indefensible standard that 
employees are eligible for unemployment benefits because they don't1 "control" the 
economy. Such a requirement creates a strict liability standard for all employers who 
employ sales personnel. Such a standard ignores the fact that in this case it was 
2
 Prosper acknowledges that at times a poor economy may result in terminations. In 
cases of a reduction in force, the economy may motivate the employer to make 
changes to protect its interests. If an employer makes changes for its benefit, benefits 
are usually awarded because the employee is separated due to no fault of his own. 
Utah Admin. Code R994-102-101(l). Such is not the case here. Hickman was 
terminated for his performance, while his teammates continued successfully at their 
jobs. 
3
 The ability to "control" the economy was never within Hickman's control. "The Act 
does not exist to protect employees from themselves, but to protect them from 
economic forces over which they have no control. When an employee is at fault, he is 
no longer the victim of fortune's whims, but is instead directly responsible for his own 
predicament. Fault on the employee's part separates him from the Act's intent and the 
Act's protection." Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Bureau of Employment Services, 653 
N.E.2d 1207 (Ohio 1995). 
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Hickman's actions or inactions that caused the separation. It was reversible error for 
the Board to award unemployment benefits on the grounds that Hickman wasn't in 
control of the economy. It was arbitrary or capricious to create require sales 
employees to be in control of the economy which is tantamount to a strict liability 
standard. 
C. Hickman did not need to have "complete control" over the circumstances 
leading to his separation and it was arbitrary and capricious to require such. 
The Board in awarding unemployment benefits affirmed the ALJ's standard that 
benefits were appropriate because the "Claimant did not have complete control over 
the low sales that led to his discharge." (R, at 072).4 The standard to be applied in 
unemployment cases has never been "complete control" over all the factors that led to 
the separation. 
In Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec, 751 P.2d 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), the employee was discharged for attendance violations. Though some of the 
absences were due to medical problems beyond Stegen's control, this Court agreed that 
"other circumstances contributing to plaintiffs absenteeism resulted from poor 
planning and from personal situations within plaintiffs control." Therefore the denial 
of benefits was affirmed on the grounds that some of the circumstances leading to the 
separation were within the claimant's control. 
4
 The Board retreated somewhat from the standard stating that neither party has 
complete control in a sales environment, (R. at 086), but the Board adopted "in foil the 
reasoning, conclusions of law, and decision of the Administrative Law Judge" (R. at 
087), thereby adopting the standard articulated by the ALJ of requiring "complete 
control" over sales. 
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The issue of control in the case of Hickman is analogous to the Stegen decision. 
Though some elements of the sales process such as the economy or consumer 
purchasing choices may have been outside of Hickman's control, the factors that led to 
the separation were within his control Elements such as his attitude, (R. at 044, lines 
33-37), whether he put his phone on "busy" or accepted more calls, (R. at 052, lines 
31-32), whether he used a different script (R. at 043, lines 1-6), and whether he was 
positive and confident about the products being offered (R. at 046, lines 22-30), were 
factors within his control The fact that other similarly situated employees were 
meeting expectations confirms that it was the elements within Hickman's control and 
not the economy that led to his separation. 
In this case, there are many elements that may have contributed to the 
separation, but the factors that establish "fault" were elements within Hickman's 
control. It was Hickman's "continued inefficiency" that caused the separation, Utah 
Admin. Code R994-405-202(3)(a)(2010), and it was arbitrary or capricious for the 
Board to hold that Hickman was eligible for benefits. 
D. The record establishes that it was within Hickman's "control" to make sales. 
Whether an employee is terminated for "just cause" is a mixed question of law 
and fact, Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), and in this case the facts also supports that it was within Hickman's 
control to make sales. Though the Board concluded that benefits were justified 
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because the economy was not within Hickman's control, the word "economy" was only 
stated once during the unemployment hearing. 
Judge: Okay. Alright, other than not feeling well, can you give me any other 
reasons for the decline in your sales performance? 
Claimant: Well, right before I left, you know, I respect (unintelligible name) a lot, 
and Mr. Stinson had given us new script and I went to that. And the 
economy was, you know, pretty bad and we were having trouble - a lot 
of us trying to get sales there for a little while. And then some of the 
others stepped it up. But - and uh - but urn, say the question again, I'm 
sorry. 
(R. at 057, lines 28-35). 
In this brief reference to the economy, Hickman clarifies his reference to the economy 
by stating that though the economy was down, "some of the others stepped it up" and 
were thus able to make sales. This statement clearly suggests that Hickman 
acknowledged that through "stepping it up" other sales representatives were able to 
makes sales regardless of the economy. 
Similarly, a few questions later the ALJ specifically asked: 
Judge: Okay. All I'm trying to get at here is what other factors could have led to 
your customers not purchasing products from you? 
(No audible response) 
Judge: Obviously, I mean, the employer said it was up to you; it's up to the 
salesperson. Do you agree with that? 
Claimant: Well, you know, I mean you have to have somebody that has a 
motivation to buy. I mean, we all - in the four years I was there, from 
time to time you just go into a sales slump and then you'd go out of it, 
okay? I mean, those things happen. And you have to just look at 
yourself and find out what you're doing wrong so that you can go 
ahead and get yourself out of that situation. Uh, talk to different 
people about what you can do and Jeremy did talk to me about things 
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like that; Keith helped me with things like that - Mr. Stinson. And uh, 
anything else? (R. at 059, lines 17-31)(Emphasis added) 
In this response, Hickman acknowledged that it was within his control to make sales. 
In his mind, he needed to look at himself to find out what he was doing wrong and 
correct it. 
Both of these responses provided by Hickman establish that even though the 
economy may have played a part in sales, Hickman believe he needed to figure out 
what he needed to do, in order to succeed. Hickman believe that others had "stepped it 
up" and that he needed to look into himself and find out what he was doing wrong so 
he too could make sales. 
This testimony clearly shows that Hickman believed that it was within his 
control to make sales. As a "just cause" discharge is a mixed question of law and fact, 
it was prejudicial, arbitrary and capricious for the Board to not accept the testimony of 
Hickman and award benefits on a single reference to the economy. The record taken 
as a whole establishes that Hickman thought it was within his control to make sales, 
and that Hickman thought he could make sales by making changes or by stepping it 
up. It was reversible error to award benefits on the grounds that it was not within 
Hickman's "control" to make sales. 
III. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE FOR A JUST CAUSE DISCHARGE WAS NOT 
ESTABLISHED. 
In addition to proving the element of control, a just cause discharge also 
requires satisfaction of the element of "knowledge". The element of knowledge 
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requires proof that the employee knew of the conduct expected, and that he or she had 
the skill and ability to do the job, Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(2) & (3)(b) 
(2010). 
In this case, Hickman had worked for Prosper for four years and knew how to 
do his job. (R. at 046, lines 11-20). Whether Hickman had the skills to do his job is 
not at issue. The question of knowledge in this case revolves around whether Prosper 
had established clear performance standards which Hickman knew. A review of the 
record as a whole establishes that he did. 
The record establishes: 
1. As Hickman's performance deteriorated, his supervisor talked to on a 
number of occasions about improving his performance. (R. at 042, lines 15-18; 
044, lines 18-22). 
2. Prosper provided written documentation of performance improvement 
discussions occurring on August 11, 2009 and August 20, 2009. (R. at 015-017, 
Exhibits 15-17). 
3. Hickman received and signed a written Counseling Report on October 
20, 2009, wherein he was told his performance was not acceptable which form 
states that "Failure to correct the above actions may result in future disciplinary 
action up to and including termination." (R. at 013, Exhibit 13). 
4. In filing for unemployment benefits, Hickman completed the 
Department's unemployment application with answers confirming he knew of 
the conduct expected of him: 
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Were you told to change or improve your job performance? YES 
Did you receive any warning before being fired or discharged? YES 
If yes, how were you warned? VERBAL 
When? 10/03/09 
Have others been fired or discharged for the same reason? YES 
How did you violate the policy? BECAUSE OF LACK OF SALE 
(R. at 009, Exhibit 9)(Responses in Bold). 
5. In responding to the initial adjudicator's telephone interview, the 
Department Representative's notes state that Hickman stated "Clmt rec'd 1 
verbal and 1 written". (R. at 010, Exhibit 10).5 
Based upon this evidence, the ALJ in her findings of fact stated: 
The Claimant knew his sales were down, and he had several discussions and 
coaching sessions with his supervisor about how he could improve his work 
performance. The supervisor encouraged the Claimant to try to stay on the 
subject matter and use a shorter script, which the Claimant did. However, there 
was no improvement in the Claimant's sales. He knew he needed to bring his 
sales up . . . [h]e believed the employer would continue working with him as he 
tried to get out of his sales slump. (R. at 071). 
Then in her Reasoning and Conclusions of Law, the ALJ stated: 
The element of knowledge has not been established. The Claimant knew what 
the employer expected of him. The Claimant received discussions and coaching 
from his supervisor which put the Claimant on notice that he needed to increase 
5
 The notes also reflect that Hickman "thought the employer policy was 1 verbal and 2 
written warnings"(R. at 010, Exhibit 10), however, Prosper's employment handbook 
states "There is no plan, policy or procedure of progressive discipline which Prosper is 
obligated to follow." (R. at 021, Exhibit 21). 
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his sales numbers. However, the Claimant was not told his job was in jeopardy. 
He believed the Employer would continue to work with him until his sales 
improved. (R. at 072)(Emphasis added). 
Such a decision in light of the Department Rules is not reasonable or rationale, and is 
arbitrary or capricious. Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv)(West 2009). 
In order to be eligible for unemployment benefits, the Department's Rules 
require that "The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer 
expected." Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(2)(2010). The ALJ as stated in her 
opinion held that "The Claimant knew what the employer expected of him." (R. at 
072). If the Department finds Hickman "knew what was expected of him," and the 
Department's Rule requires Hickman have knowledge of the "conduct the employer 
expected", it is unclear how the element of knowledge has not been satisfied.6 
The ALJ reasoned that the element of "knowledge" had not been met because 
Hickman "believed the Employer would continue to work with him until his sales 
improved." (R. at 072). The issue of "working with" an employee has been previously 
addressed. In Law Offices of David Paul White & Assoc, v Board of Review, 778 P.2d 
6
 In its initial appeal to the Board, Prosper inadvertently stated that the element of 
knowledge had been met. This oversight was corrected in its subsequent motion and 
thoroughly presented to the Board. (R. at 091-093). Since unemployment appeals are 
often handled by non-lawyers and require only "a statement of the reason for the 
appeal" Utah Admin. Code R994-508-101(4)(2010), "the scope of the appeal is not 
limited to the issues stated in the appeal." Utah Admin. Code R994-508-101 (5)(2010). 
The Board had wide latitude to consider the element of knowledge "even if it was not 
presented at the hearing or raised by the parties on appeal". Utah Admin. Code R994-
508-305(2010). The Board knew of the misstatement and could have addressed the 
issue, or, as allowed by Rule "requested additional information or evidence" from 
Prosper. Utah Admin. Code R994-508-305(2010). 
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21 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the employer had given the employee specific instruction 
regarding appropriate behavior. The claimant's behavior would improve for several 
days and then revert back to her former behavior. In awarding benefits the Board 
concluded that whatever counseling the employer gave was negated by the employer's 
continued acceptance of her behavior. Id. at 25. In rejecting this analysis, this Court 
reversed the decision of the Board and cited favorably to the Board's dissenting 
opinion stating "An employer who is willing to take ample time to work with an 
employee to resolve objectionable conduct ought not to be penalized when he finally 
terminates the employee who demonstrates improved performance for a period of time 
and then reverts again to unacceptable conduct." Id. 
In the present case, Hickman's performance began to decline beginning in 
April/May 2009. (R. at 042, lines 3-4). Between May 2, 2009 and October 31, 2009, 
Hickman only had two sales. (R. at 056, lines 26-42; 061, lines 2-13; 008, Exhibit 8). 
During this time "Claimant knew his sales were down, and he had several discussions 
and coaching sessions with his supervisor about how he could improve his work 
performance."(R. at 071). Hickman admitted receiving training, verbal warnings, and 
written warnings, yet his only defense was that he believed his employer would 
"continue to work with him" until his sales improved. (R. at 071). 
For six months Prosper had "worked with" Hickman and his sales had not 
improved. (R. 044, lines 11-13). Similar to David Paul White & Assoc, Prosper is 
being penalized, and its verbal and written warnings negated, for "take[ing] ample 
time to work with an employee to resolve objectionable conduct" before terminating 
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him. Each week Prosper was sending live customers to Hickman. Each transfer cost 
Prosper money. Hickman knew how to do his job and had been successful at it. As a 
sales representative paid on commission, Hickman was expected to make sales each 
week. Only making two sales in six-months was wholly unsatisfactory. Hickman 
knew what was expected of him and it is unclear what more Prosper should have done 
to establish clearer expectations. Prosper asserts the element of knowledge had been 
satisfied. It was not reasonable or rational to rule that Hickman didn't have knowledge 
of what was expected of him when the ALJ found that Hickman knew what was 
expected of him. It was arbitrary or capricious ignore the testimony and documentary 
evidence and to conclude that the element of "knowledge" had not been satisfied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals 
Board's decision affirming the Administrative Law Judge's award of unemployment 
benefits to Hickman. This Court should find that Hickman was terminated for just 
cause and it was an abuse of discretion to award unemployment benefits. 
DATED this /£__ day of August, 2010. 
Daniel J. Anderson 
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner 
Prosper Team, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code §35A-4-405(2)(West 2009). 
(2) (a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause or for an act 
or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which is 
deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so 
found by the division, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to 
at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered 
employment. 
(b) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for dishonesty constituting 
a crime or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection with the claimant's work 
as shown by the facts, together with the claimant's admission, or as shown by the 
claimant's conviction of that crime in a court of competent jurisdiction and for the 51 
next following weeks. 
(c) Wage credits shall be deleted from the claimant's base period, and are not 
available for this or any subsequent claim for benefits. 
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R994-102-101(l). Authority and Statement of the Rules. 
(1) One of the purposes of the Employment Security Act, Utah Code Section 35A-4-
101 et seq., the Act, is to lighten the burdens of persons unemployed through no fault of 
their own by maintaining their purchasing power in the economy. The legislature, in 
establishing this program, recognized the substantial social ills associated with 
unemployment and sought to ameliorate these problems with a program to pay workers 
for a limited time while they seek other employment. 
R994-405-202. Just Cause 
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements must be 
satisfied: 
(1) Culpability. 
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the conduct 
was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it would be 
continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's prior work 
record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an isolated incident 
or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able to demonstrate that a 
single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a long-term employee with 
an established pattern of complying with the employer's rules. In this instance, depending 
on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be necessary for the employer to discharge 
the claimant to avoid future harm. 
(2) Knowledge. 
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected. 
There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer; however, 
it must be shown the claimant should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of 
the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave a 
clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a 
violation of a universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the 
claimant had knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should 
have been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had 
a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the sepeiration, it generally 
must have been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very 
severe infractions, including criminal actions. 
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(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment are not 
sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued inefficiency, 
repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a reasonable person in 
a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the claimant had the 
ability to perform satisfactorily. 
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may be 
necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While such a 
circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits will be 
denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due to 
unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to 
perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a 
good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill 
or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established. 
R994-405-208 (2). Examples of Reasons for Discharge 
In the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be considered in 
determining eligibility for benefits. 
(2) Attendance Violations. 
(a) Attendance standards are usually necessary to maintain order, control, and 
productivity. It is the responsibility of a claimant to be punctual and remain at work 
within the reasonable requirements of the employer. A discharge for unjustified absence 
or tardiness is disqualifying if the claimant knew enforced attendance rules were being 
violated. A discharge for an attendance violation beyond the claimant's control is 
generally not disqualifying unless the claimant could reasonably have given notice or 
obtained permission consistent with the employer's rules, but failed to do so. 
(b) In cases of discharge for violations of attendance standards, the claimant's recent 
attendance history must be reviewed to determine if the violation is an isolated incident, 
or if it demonstrates a pattern of unjustified absence within the claimant's control The 
flagrant misuse of attendance privileges may result in a denial of benefits even if the last 
incident is beyond the claimant's control. 
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R994-508-101. Right to Appeal an Initial Department Determination 
(1) An interested party has the right to appeal an initial Department determination on 
unemployment benefits or unemployment tax liability (contributions) by filing an appeal 
with the Appeals Unit or at any DWS Employment Center. 
(2) The appeal must be in writing and either sent through the U.S Mail, faxed, or 
delivered to the Appeals Unit, or submitted electronically through the Department's 
website. 
(3) The appeal must be signed by an interested party unless it can be shown that the 
interested party has conveyed, in writing, the authority to another person or is physically 
or mentally incapable of acting on his or her own behalf. Providing the correct Personal 
Identification Number (PIN) when filing an appeal through the Department's website will 
be considered a signed appeal. 
(4) The appeal should give the date of the determination being appealed, the social 
security number of any claimant involved, the employer number, a statement of the 
reason for the appeal, and any and all information which supports the appeal. The failure 
of an appellant to provide the information in this subsection will not preclude the 
acceptance of an appeal. 
(5) The scope of the appeal is not limited to the issues stated in the appeal. 
(6) If the claimant is receiving benefits at the time the appeal is filed, payments will 
continue pending the written decision of the ALJ even if the claimant is willing to waive 
payment. If benefits are denied as a result of the appeal, an overpayment will be 
established. 
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01 APPEALS UNIT 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
Appellant Respondent 
PROSPER TEAM INC PHILLIP L HICKMAN 
C/O HUMAN RESOURCES 2465 W 450 S APT 2 
5072 N 300 W SPRINGVILLE UT 84663-4942 
PROVO UT 84604-5652 
S.S.A. NO: XXX-XX-9813 CASE NO: 09-A-18345 
APPEAL DECISION: The Department decision is affirmed. 
The Claimant is allowed unemployment benefits. 
The Employer is charged. 
CASE HISTORY: 
Appearances: Employer / Claimant / Employer Rep 
Issues to be Decided: 35A-4-405(2)(a) - Discharge 
35A-4-307 - Employer Charges 
The original Department decision allowed unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant 
was discharged without just cause. That decision also charged the Employer's benefit ratio account for 
benefits paid to the Claimant. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from January 7, 
2010, further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the 
grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Prior to opening a claim for unemployment benefits effective November 1, 2009, the Claimant worked for 
Prosper Team, Inc. as a sales representative. The Claimant was discharged on October 28, 2009, for poor 
sales performance. 
The Claimant worked for the Employer for four years and for much of that time he met or exceeded the 
Employer's expectations for sales. Beginning in April or May 2009, the Claimant's sales began to decline. 
In June 2009 the Claimant went through a surgery to repair a double hernia and was off work for five days. 
He returned to work too soon and his health suffered a setback. He began working on a part-time basis until 
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Phillip L. Hickman - 2 - 09-A-18345 
August 3, 2009, when he returned to work full-time. His sales were still not good. The last sale he made 
prior to his discharge was on August 29, 2009. 
The Claimant's sales were poor in part because he did not feel well for several months. He did his best to 
keep a positive attitude and follow the suggestions of his supervisor. Other factors contributed to the 
Claimant's poor sales including a poor economy, and potential customers who did not have money or did 
not want to spend it on the Employer's services, or were not motivated to get out of debt. 
The Claimant knew his sales were down, and he had several discussions and coaching sessions with his 
supervisor about how he could improve his work performance. The supervisor encouraged the Claimant 
to try to stay on the subject matter and use a shorter script, which the Claimant did. However, there was no 
improvement in the Claimant's sales. The supervisor believed the Claimant did not appear to be confident 
about the Employer's programs or its clients. The Claimant did his best to show a positive attitude. He 
knew he needed to bring his sales up, but he did not know his job was in jeopardy. He believed the 
Employer would continue working with him as he tried to get out of his sales slump. 
When the Claimant did not make the sales the Employer expected, the Employer ended up paying for leads 
that did not convert into sales, and the Employer lost money. The Employer regularly discharges sales 
representatives who do not produce enough sales. The Employer does not want to keep sales people who 
do not contribute to the success of the team or who bring morale down when they bring the team's sales 
numbers down. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just cause for discharging the 
employee. In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, there must be fault on the part of the employee involved. The basic factors as 
established by the rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a), which are essential for a determination of 
ineligibility under the definition of just cause, are: 
(a) Culpability. The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing 
the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interests . . . 
(b) Knowledge. The worker must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the 
employer expected . . . 
(c) Control. The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control. . . 
The Employer has established the element of culpability. Culpability is shown when an employee's conduct 
was harmful to the employer's rightful interests. The Employer hired the Claimant to sell its coaching 
programs, and the Claimant was unable to meet the Employer's expectations on a consistent basis. The 
Employer still had to pay for leads for its sales people. The Employer was legitimately concerned about the 
lack of sales causing harm to the Employer. 
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The element of knowledge has not been established The Claimant knew what the Employer expected of 
him The Claimant received discussions and coaching from his supervisor which put the Claimant on notice 
that he needed to increase his sales numbeis However, the Claimant was not told his job was in jeopardy 
He believed the Employer would continue to work with him until his sales impioved 
The element of control has not been established The Claimant did not have complete control over the low 
sales that led to his discharge Increasing sales depended on others agieemg to purchase the Employer's 
services ovei other options for their money, which the Claimant could not conti ol There are many possible 
reasons a potential customer would choose not to use the Employer's services The Employer may have had 
good reasons for wanting to leplace the Claimant with someone who could bring the team's sales numbeis 
up, but this does not mean employment benefits will be denied To satisfy the element of conn ol, the 
Employer must show the Claimant had the ability and contiol to consistently meet the Employer's 
expectations In this case, there were too many othei factors involved to give the Claimant control over his 
sales, including the poor economy and the high unemployment rate 
Based on a picpondeiance of the evidence, the Employer has failed to estabhshed all of the elements of a 
just cause dischaige and benefits are allowed 
The Utah Employment Security Act does not giant an employei relief of charges for unemployment 
msuiance benefits when the employer dischai ged the claimant for reasons which are not disqualifying undei 
Section 35A-4-405(2) In this case the Claimant was not dischaiged foi disqualifying reasons and the 
Employer, therefoie, is ineligible for relief of charges 
DECISION AND ORDER: 
The original Department decision allowing the payment of unemployment msuiance benefits pursuant to 
Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed Benefits are allowed effective 
November 1, 2009, and continuing, provided the Claimant is othei wise eligible 
The Employer is not relieved of charges as provided by Section 35 A-4-307 of the Utah Employment Security 
Act and is liable for its prorated share of benefits paid to this Claimant 
cobyn Spongberg 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
Issued January 7, 2010 
RS/rs/kf 
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'.*••'HRDK WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD 
KM . " Department of Workforce Services 
Div isiou of Adjudication 
Pill! I.LiP L HICKMAN, CLAIMANT 
SS A No. XXX-XX-W13 : 
: Case No. I0-B-0014.S 
PROSPER ThAM INC., : 
EM PI OYER 
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
Phe decision of the Administrate e Law Judge is affirmed. 
Benefits are allowed. 
The Employer is not relieved of benefit charges. 
HISTORY OF CASE: 
In a decision dated January ", 2010, Case No. 09-A-l 8345. the Administrate e Law Judge affirmed 
ihc Department decision and allowed unemployment insurance benefits \o the Claimant efiec!i\e 
Novembc! 1. 2009. The Ernploser. Prosper Team, Inc.. was ineligible :or relief of bene ill charges 
in coinecuon with this claim. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
'fhe Workfoice Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
pursuant lo ^ 5 A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Seeunh Act and the Utah 
AdminKltatec Code (1997) pertaining thereto. 
EMPLOYER APPEAL FILED: February 4, 2010. 
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS 
OF ITAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT: 
1 Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the- provisions of 
s\i5A-4-4U5(2)fa)? 
2 Is ihc Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the pro', isions of §35A-4- V~)~?( j)'.' 
FACTUAL FINDINGS: 
fhe Y\ orkibice Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of lite Administrative Lav* Judge. 
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M ASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; 
The Claimant worked for the Employer selling financial coaching services over the telephone for 
four years. The hmpioyer had another company get live prospects on the telephone and transfer the 
mdi\ iduals to the Kmpldyer's phone room where any available salesperson could answer die phone 
and use the Employer's written scripts to attempt to convince the caller of a need for their <er\ ices 
and close the sale. 
The Claimant had been a top producer until his sales started falling off in April or May 2009 The 
product being sold was expensive, with the Claimant's last two sales being $6,000 and SI0.000. 
!}noi to hitting a slump in 2009. the Claimant had had weeks where he had sold $40J)0U to $50,000 
o\ coaching services in a single week. 
Coinciding uilli the Claimant's fall in production were the failing economy, a need foi potential 
purchasers to more carefully consider expenditures, and health issues that caused the Claimant to be 
absent or axailable less than full-lime for a considerable period. 
In oruer for benefits lo be denied to the Claimant the Board must be able lo determine Ihal the 
Lmnloyer established, by a preponderance oflhe evidence, each of the three elements of a just cause 
discharge knowledge, control, and culpability. If there is inadequate proof of even a single jus! 
cause factor, benefits \m\s\ be allowed. 
The Administrative Law Judge ioimd culpability in that the Employer was harmed by expending 
money for Icad.s without getting sales, but that the Claimant had not been warned thai his 
employment was :n jeopardy and that he had little control over whether potential customers would 
he wiiimg ;o spend the kind of money the Kmploycr was asking for such services. 
In ns appeal to the Workforce Appeals Board the iimployer argues thai between the months of May 
and. October 200*\ the Claimant only made two sales, and that his lack of performance was 
detrimental to ihe Employer and was the primary reason for the termination. 
1 he bmpioyer misstates thai the Judge found both culpability and know ledge had been estabhVhed 
ITe 'Vimmis.rat'Ne 1 aw Judge only found that culpability had been nroxen by the Kmploycr. The 
Lmployei lurthcr suggest m the appeal tnai the Claimant \vorked HIM as a commissioned 
salesperson, although, the record show s his rate of pay as being S7.25 per hour pins commissions 
file Board agrees w ith the Kmploy er's proposition that the outcome is not entirely within the control 
of either ihe iimployer or the Claimant in sales, and this would be especially true m the case of 
attempted telephone sales to a potential customer previously unfamiliar with the company and 
product being offered. 
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I here are mam [actors thai come into play in whether a sale is made, including price, type of 
pioducL the economy, and the economic security of the prospective customer, among other things 
hven though neither party has complete control in a sales environment, as pointed out by the 
hmployer, in an unemployment insurance discharge proceeding the burden is upon the Kmployer to 
prove that the Claimant was the one who had the ability to control the environment that would allow 
him to meet the i:mployer's expectations. 
! he hmployer also makes an unfounded assertion that the Administrative Law Judge's decision, ll 
allowed to stand, would establish a precedent that all sales employees will always be guaranteed to 
icceive benefits T\\a Ls not correct The unemployment insurance hearing deosions i>sued In 
aummisirahve law nidges, as well as the decisions handed down by the Workforce Appeals Board, 
aa\ h\ Jaw, deemed confidential and cannot establish a precedent Only decisions issued by the 
( ourt of Appeals or higher courts of law must be followed by the administrative law fudges and the 
Board 
It w as the duty of (he Administrative Law Judge assigned to this case lo resolve an} conflict mg facts 
and nuke a determination of the relative weight to be given to differing \crsions of events Since 
the iudge was m the unique position of being an active participant n. the hearing, interacting with 
the parties and also questioning the witnesses, her findings will not be disturbed by the Board n there 
is evidence m the record lo support her decision 
i he Board recognizes that the hmployer fell it had a legitimate business concern w itli the Claimant's 
.ack of production, requiring his disci large, but this is not sufficient -absent proof of the Claimant's 
ineligibility under the applicable law and rules-to warrant a denial of unemployment insurance 
benefits. 
i he Board finds that the record does not show by a preponderance of the e\ icicnce that the Claimant 
had the necessary control in his situation lo be able to meet the Hnploycr's performance 
expectations The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the reasoning, conclusions of law, and 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge. 
DECISION: 
[he decision of the Administrative Law Judge allowing unemployment msuianec benefit to the 
Claimant effective Wvembei I, 2009, under the provisions of £J5A~4 4H5(2iLU of the Ltah 
Lmployment Secunty Vet. is affirmed 
! he hmployer, Prosper Team, Inc., is ineligible for relief of benefit charges in connection with, this 
ciaim as pro\ idcd by §35 A-4-307(1) of the Act. 
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APPEAL RIGHTS: 
Pursuant to §63~46b-13(i)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request 
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request 
for reconsideration musf be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The request must be tiled with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy ofthe request for reconsideration must also be mailed lo 
each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an 
order within 20 days after the fl ling ofthe request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered 
lo he denied pursuant to §63~46h-13(3)(b) ofthe Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing 
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order If a 
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This 
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for 
such an appeal. 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in 
writing within 30 days ofthe date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the 
fifth floor ofthe Scot! M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South Suae Street, P. O. Box 140230, 
Salt bake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board, 
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk ofthe Court a Petition for Writ 
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508{8) ofthe Utah Employment 
Security Act; §63~46h- i 6 ofthe Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 
and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Dale issued: Mareh 8. 2010 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify thai I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on 
(his 8th day of March, 2010, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, 
United States mail to: 
PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT 
PROSPER TEAM TNC 
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